Ayesha Nibbe
Almost nine months after the release of KONY 2012, Joseph Kony is a distant memory for most of the original 100+ million viewers of the historic viral video. The creators of the video, Invisible Children (IC), accomplished a great deal with KONY 2012 – millions of people were introduced to them (and Joseph Kony), they (and Joseph Kony) landed on the cover of TIME magazine, and the names “Invisible Children” (and “Joseph Kony”) entered into the global imaginary as actors in an international justice drama. But in order for Invisible Children to move forward with their larger organizational aims, the hangover from biting criticism after the release of the video needed to be resolved and IC’s founder Jason Russell’s dramatic psychological breakdown required explanation. To that end, MOVE –a video released by Invisible Children in mid-October – was produced to address IC’s critics head-on and to reassure their base of support that Jason has fully recovered and is ready to reassume his role of “head visionary” at Invisible Children.
In MOVE, Invisible Children answers the question: “What happened?” First, Jason explains his breakdown as a result of “PTSD” (post-traumatic stress syndrome) after being confronted with violent, gruesome northern Uganda war stories for over nine years. Furthermore, the pressures of mounting a huge youth social movement to help the children of Gulu exacerbated these psychological effects; while Invisible Children is a wildly successful social movement, the organization has thus far been unable to achieve their ultimate stated goal to capture Joseph Kony and end the war. These two factors coupled with being submerged by the “tsunami” of media attention (and the resulting severe sleep deprivation) after the release of KONY 2012, ultimately caused Jason’s breakdown. To this end, MOVE is effective – Jason Russell’s personal reputation is restored – one would have to be incredibly hard-hearted to not be touched by his sensitivity, honesty, and commitment as portrayed in this video.
Invisible Children then addresses the criticisms waged against the organization and KONY 2012 one-by-one. Why did Jason choose to explain a complex conflict to his young son as a method to “Make Kony Famous”? Jason argues this was a strategic move to get people to pay attention to the story. He explains, “If you just report the facts and the statistics of a war, people can’t relate…they turn it off.” In response to whether or not Invisible Children is a “scam,” another IC staff person explains that much of the confusion about the organization stemmed from weak infrastructural capacity – their website could not handle the unexpectedly large traffic caused by KONY 2012 (a reported 35,000 concurrent viewers). To handle the volume of web-traffic, Invisible Children set up a Tumblr account to buttress their website, but this site only provided a portion of the information located on the official Invisible Children website. Hence, they explain, KONY 2012 viewers were introduced to Invisible Children by a sketchy, incomplete website that made them look suspicious. As for the “propaganda” allegation, Invisible Children essentially does not touch that question; Chief Financial Officer Ben Keesey simply states that this allegation is “absolutely false.” As for the “slacktivism” accusation – it is hard to argue that Invisible Children consists of a bunch of “slackers” in any way, shape, or form. They revolutionized social activism using new media forms and organized the largest advocacy groups to walk on Washington DC for any African cause, including Darfur. Just a few weeks ago, on November 17th, Invisible Children reportedly led 10,000 followers to Washington DC to lobby the US Government to act on the Kony case. Invisible Children is no joke – underestimate them at your peril.
As has been the case for most of Invisible Children’s existence – many allegations waged against them by casual observers are uninformed and oftentimes unfair. IC staff and volunteers spend their time doing things we wish all young people would do in America – that is, working tirelessly to “make the world a better place.” But this video, MOVE – like most of the media produced by Invisible Children – is also uninformed and unfair, especially to their “do-gooder” followers. First of all, the discussion about “the conflict,” “Joseph Kony,” or “the LRA” is completely dehistoricized and decontextualized in ways that I do not have space in this blog to fully articulate. (If you want to learn more about this, look at the website http://makingsenseofkony.org, the e-book Beyond Kony edited by Amanda Taub, or find other substantive books on the conflict here). But beyond the one-dimensional narratives in which Invisible Children specializes, MOVE unabashedly reveals what the organization cherishes more than anything – perhaps even more than the capture of Joseph Kony: they want to give young America a sense of purpose. Young Americans (or the “millenials”) are purportedly accused by adults of being lazy, self-absorbed, tech-savvy, over-confident, and “too busy trying to get noticed on FB or Twitter to accomplish anything of value.” IC’s Jedidiah Jenkins states in another video that Invisible Children’s campaigns offer an opportunity to “prove the universal through the specific.” In other words, the specific case of conflict in northern Uganda, Joseph Kony, and the LRA is a vehicle through which Invisible Children can address a universal, i.e. a perceived sense of aimlessness, alienation, and disempowerment of American youth. Invisible Children aims to “change the mindset of Western young people to see…that they can do profoundly good things with their life.” One could argue that the ultimate goal of Invisible Children is not to capture Kony or to “End The War” itself – or even to “make the world a better place” – but rather to offer young Americans a one-way ticket out of their social ennui.
I have encountered this “giving American youth a sense of purpose” rhetoric consistently in my dealings with Invisible Children over the past six years, but I never understood the centrality of this part of their ideology until now. About a month ago, I visited Southern California to give a talk about KONY 2012 and I was invited to dinner by the Invisible Children club at UCLA. Just minutes into our conversation, the club members realized I was not a “fan” of KONY 2012 – but we still talked and listened to each other. I explained the history of the conflict, who benefits from the conflict (and KONY 2012), and how powerful entities are in a sense using the Invisible Children movement to justify military expansion and dictatorial powers in the region. Hearing the damning evidence about their organization, the faces of these young people dropped and they looked at me with blank, vacant stares – so I stopped at one point and asked, “Wait…you’ve never heard any of this before?” They shook their heads – they hadn’t. Towards the end of our conversation one of the students said, “Well, I’m probably going to stay involved in this…and probably will for the rest of my life because it’s changed my life, and I’ve seen how it’s changed other people’s lives as well.” I could not believe what I was hearing – she was completely focused on the benefits to her of being involved in this group, regardless of whatever geopolitical mess they as a group were stepping into. Being in Invisible Children gave her and others a reason for being, and perhaps a sense of community that they could not find elsewhere.
This reminded me of those first three young guys who started Invisible Children – Jason, Bobby, and Laren. In nine years, they spawned an incredibly impressive youth social movement and revolutionized how advocacy is done in the US – and they accomplished all of this in spite of an almost complete ignorance of the larger context of the conflict in northern Uganda. Now, with their “LRA Crisis Tracker” system in place, Invisible Children probably knows the nitty-gritty details of the whereabouts of the LRA and Joseph Kony better than anyone. And I assume they probably know the larger historical context more fully than they did when I met one of the founders in 2006. But Invisible Children still willingly turns its head away from acknowledging the role it plays in furthering the interests of powerful entities – political leaders wanting to secure or grab power, foreign military actors (like US-AFRICOM or the Ugandan government/military) that aim to expand deep into Africa where there are vast natural resources, or agents that promote ineffective, top-down, Western models of “international justice” like those prescribed by the International Criminal Court. The disquieting overall message of MOVE is that Invisible Children is so deeply invested in its mission to give young Americans a raison d’être, they are willing to meddle in a situation in which their actions will undoubtedly reinforce the structural conditions that cause war, poverty, and violence in the first place.
Ayesha Nibbe is an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Hawaii Pacific University. Her work focuses generally on questions about poverty and hunger and how “the West” engages in a relationship with the rest of the world via development and humanitarianism. Dr. Nibbe is currently producing a book manuscript on the socio-political effects of humanitarian aid in the context of the conflict in northern Uganda. To conduct research for this book, she lived in northern Uganda for over two years in both Gulu town and Opit internal displacement (IDP) camp – starting when the war was in full-swing and ending in Peace Talks.
This is the finest writing I have seen in years. Dr. Nibbe has a real command of
this information and a literary style without peer in the field. This is a must read.
Very Well written. I have been living in Gulu for the past two years and totally understand and agree with all she writes. So glad she is courageous enough to speak the truth when public opinion might differ.
Excellent. Thanks Ayesha.
In mentioning Invisible Children’s raison d’etre, you failed to write their mission statement: Invisible Children exists to permanently end LRA violence–they can’t say it much more plainly than that.
The best part about this is that you offer no alternative for ending LRA violence. The nuances and analysis in this article offer nothing to the current victims of LRA violence who can not protect themselves. You do realize that the LRA has chosen the countries it is currently in strategically, countries that do not have effective military forces to protect civilians–the DRC calls it a ‘police issue’ saying there are 7 LRA in their country. CAR finally sent 450 soldiers to LRA-affected regions after two years of intense violence. …Isn’t it just terrible that american would send a limited force (100 soldiers), to assist forces and provide oversight in an effort to protect civilians and end the LRA issue?
You also neglect to acknowledge that Invisible Children has done more than any NGO to encourage the peaceful surrender of LRA combatants.
I’ve yet to see any academic that disagrees with an approach that includes military teeth to fight a brutal armed group — offer an alternative.
Well you may very well be right about a violent response to counter violence -but there’s no way any of the major players are in this just for the sake of helping people. To campaign against LRA atrocity and be allied with the Ugandan military is obscene, given their role in the conflict. Why is official US policy so selective about condemning use of child soldiers. Obama’s implicit message is It’s ok for militias backed by Rwandan and Ugandan military or other US allies
Hi Ayesha –
A well-written and largely fair-minded piece. Thanks for the reflection.
I share your interest in seeing human rights activism informed by a firm grasp on context as well as due caution about unintended consequences. But I think it’s a stretch to claim that because IC mobilizes huge numbers by cultivating a community with a sense of purpose, IC therefore exists to do that more than they do to address the causes of insecurity in LRA-affected areas.
You admit that their model has been highly effective in funding programs and influencing policy, but why does that necessarily suggest that it isn’t a means to doing so rather than an end in itself? Your evidence here is an anecdote from a single young activist, combined with your credibility as someone with a long history of studying the issue (which is certainly nothing to take lightly) who disagrees with the thrust of the campaign.
Herein lies — for me — a repetition of what is/was the greatest frustration in the KONY 2012 debates. In reaction to an intentionally simple film and campaign, critics (well, the uncrazy ones anyway) acted as though the existence of any factor that suggests greater complexity or risk than was explicitly acknowledged in the film indicates that the whole effort was predicated on a lack of understanding those complicating factors and/or their possible adverse consequences. AKA, those behind it must be either (1) ill-informed or (2) ill-intentioned (and usually both!).
While this kept the KONY 2012 conversation going longer publicly than a more fair-minded discussion may have, it nonetheless misses the reality that those of us crafting the policy strategy behind these efforts are not only well read on the history of the conflict and familiar with the varying viewpoints about its root causes and solutions (as you acknowledge as likely), but are also predicating our actions on legitimate, thoughtful analysis about what is in the best interest of long-term peace in the region. It goes beyond the dynamics that drove conflict in Uganda, where violence ended in 2006, to also include an exhaustive understanding of the drivers and spectrum of possible responses to LRA atrocities that continue in neighboring countries.
To suggest that we simply “turn our heads†to the risks and complexities involved with our task, as if no one who is knowledgeable could possibly disagree with your perspective, is an overreach. Even more so to suggest that our work “undoubtedly†reinforces the conditions that cause war, poverty, and violence.
Perhaps such statements would be more defensible if the thinking behind the film and campaign was shared only by three California filmmakers. But it is also shared by the leading organizations conducting research and advocacy on the region’s security and human rights challenges, including HRW, ICG, myriad local organizations in LRA-affected areas, and us at Resolve.
I think basing your critique on the false premise that thoughtful people don’t have diverse viewpoints — or that there isn’t a large body of thought defending the campaign’s agenda — avoids the harder work of teasing out the real roots of our disagreements. We — and many others from a variety of organizations living and working in LRA-affected areas — are aware of your views. We just respectfully disagree.
Well Michael pretty much stole the show here, but since I was invited to re-post the following comment I left the other day, I guess I’ll share it anyway…
Here’s what I wrote (apropos Michael’s comments):
“This is an excellent piece.
I do think you [Prof Nibbe] have left out a lot about what IC has accomplished (e.g. their scholarship program, support for schools, proposed rehab center in Gulu, DDR propaganda, etc.), and their narrative is less depoliticized at the highest levels (e.g. see “Peace Can Be,†the Resolve report held up by IC as the best supporting case for their strategy).
But your point is nonetheless well put and valid, especially for IC supporters at the lower levels, that is the vast bulk of IC supporters.”
Hi Michael,
Thank you for your thoughtful response. I always appreciate your input in panel discussions and articles on the matter. Although I would like to challenge one point you make- that “it’s a stretch to claim that because IC mobilizes huge numbers by cultivating a community with a sense of purpose, IC therefore exists to do that more than they do to address the causes of insecurity in LRA-affected areas”.
My disagreement is partly anecdotal- it stems from my time spent working at Invisible Children in San Diego. (In fact during my second internship I actually spent a little bit of time in your DC office!). During my time with IC, my peers and supervisors constantly spoke of changing American lives. So much so that the (then) Movement Director very openly and proudly valued IC’s impact on American lives more than the impact in Uganda and LRA-affected areas . It is a view that many shared— watching youth suddenly believe in themselves and try to change the world because of your work was inspiring and very rewarding. Whenever criticism was lodged at the finances ( ie why more money was spent on programs in america and media combined than on programs in LRA-affected areas) it was received with a collective eye-roll within the organization. The critics were dismissed as simply not “understanding” IC’s mission— that changing lives in America was just as important and integral to their mission, and to some more important, as changing lives in Uganda.
I am fully aware of the work that IC does throughout LRA-affected areas; however it would be a stretch for me to deny that internally the spotlight was placed on IC’s impact in the west much more often than not.
Rima, thanks for the reply.
I didn’t mean to suggest that IC doesn’t place a big emphasis on “changing lives in America,” as they certainly do. As you know, there is an entire Movement Department within IC that is built around engaging young Americans in a way that opens them up to issues like the LRA (for life, hopefully). Their approach uses media that engages their student-age audience by “meeting them where they’re at,” which typically involves simplistic narratives and lots of white people interspersed with discussions of the conflict, which many find distasteful.
That approach is also precisely the key to the organization’s impact. It enables them to mobilize large numbers to both influence policy (I can attest to that, many times over… they are the envy of the advocacy community in DC) and raise funds to implement their programs.
The question posed by Dr. Nibbe is whether their first goal is to “change American lives” or to influence the LRA situation, and how they balance the two. My argument here is simply that (a) the way that they engage young Americans builds enormous political and financial power, and (b) there is a large body of thought (and indeed evidence) that supports the goals and impacts they seek to achieve with that power.
Dr. Nibbe acknowledges the first, but her argument completely disregards the second, allowing her to inaccurately (in my view) accuse them of pursuing a “change in America” agenda at the expense of LRA-affected communities.
To explore Dr. Nibbe’s question fairly, one needs to (1) acknowledge the widely lauded programming they’ve done in the region (per Jake’s point above) and (2) produce a much fairer discussion of their/our political advocacy agenda (for instance, by recognizing that it is largely shared by civil society groups in LRA-affected areas and other leading human rights/conflict resolution actors).
And of course acknowledging those two points makes their method of building power in America look a lot more thoughtful and effective than Dr. Nibbe’s piece suggests.